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ABSTRACT 
The Gulf and Caribbean region, like many other parts of the world, is littered with failed or failing fisheries projects. They 
come in all sorts, shapes, and sizes. Under the rubric of fisheries governance, with its emphasis on civil society participation as an 
expected factor of success, of particular interest are projects that involve state fisheries authorities or fisherfolk non-governmental 
organizations and external donor agencies. Such project partnerships, if well designed, are intended to yield win-win outcomes. In 
this paper I examine the proposition that perhaps these projects are short term win-win, even if they truly fail in the long term. Such 
‘beneficial’ failure may be the result of collusion amongst the actors that has serious implications for governance. Project failure (in 
its literal sense) is easier to define than success. The key is to refer to agreed goals and objectives. Goal displacement, adaptation or 
other adjustments must be taken into account. Still, observations suggest that it is not uncommon for grantees to ‘almost succeed’ on 
a recurring basis that provides the grantors with opportunities to continue funding the same grantees, and to forecast the likely 
outcomes. This fine-tuning of failure perpetuates a mutually beneficial supply and demand until some perturbation breaks the cycle. 
Fine-tuning failure is a coping strategy that constrains self-organization, adaptive capacity and resilience in fisheries governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Game theory is the study of the ways in which strategically planned interactions among agents produce outcomes with 
respect to the preferences of those agents, including situations in which the outcomes achieved are not those intended by 
any of the agents (Ross 2011). The uncertainty and non-linearity associated with predicting what actions and interactions 
among actors will most likely lead to which outcomes, is also a feature of resilience thinking, such as applied to complex 
adaptive social-ecological systems and governance (Walker and Salt 2006). Sometimes there are surprises. These surprises 
can be either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ as judged by the actors using the criteria for the original preferences, or perhaps based on new 
preferences that emerge over the course of their interaction. Some of these actors will be in positions of decision-making 
and hence able to determine whether interactions cease or continue depending on the outcomes. If such decisions, and the 
institutions that guide both them and the actions to follow, are at a societal level, they are within the realm of governance. 
Put more formally, governance is about interactions to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities, 
including attention to the principles guiding interactions and institutions that enable and constrain them (Kooiman et al. 
2005). Governance is the lens through which I look briefly at the ways in which fisheries funding agencies and fishing 
industry beneficiaries often play games characterized by having both positive and negative outcomes, but with considerable 
long term collateral damage to institutions of marine resource governance. In summary, fishing industry beneficiary 
organizations have incentives to perform credibly, but not quite succeed, if they hope to obtain a steady stream funds from a 
willing donor. Success may result in ‘graduation’ and the cessation of funding. The donor, in turn, needs beneficiaries who 
will perform credibly, but still provide a steady demand for their financial goods and services. These actors can engage in a 
cyclical pattern of performance and interaction that attracts funding by not quite succeeding, perhaps for different reasons, 
upon each new round of financial assistance that is offered because the previous one almost achieved its objectives. This 
cycle may break down after a couple of rounds, or it may persist for several. Ultimately, however, it is typically unsustaina-
ble. Reasons for collapse may emanate from either party. In the process, it is likely that institutions of local level marine 
resource governance will be injured by dependence on external assistance coupled with erosion of social capital and 
mechanisms for self-organization. 
This scenario is good fodder for the application of rigorously quantitative game theory. My analysis here, however, is 
completely qualitative and slightly cynical. Nevertheless, it contains some serious messages for those engaged in this 
unsustainable game. In the next section I set out some simple rules of the game followed by examination of the funding 
agency and beneficiary strategies. The resulting rhythm is explored as well as the collateral damage caused by the patterns 
of interaction. I conclude with a few thoughts on how to ‘grow’ healthier institutions of governance.  
 
RULES OF THE GAME 
The principal players or actors are the funding agency (donor) and fishing industry organisation (beneficiary). The 
donor is typically an external agency, such as an inter-governmental or non-governmental body, rather than one embedded 
within national fisheries arrangements. The beneficiary is typically a fishery cooperative or association with limited internal 
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capacity and only moderate network capacity derived from 
relationships with individuals or other organisations. These 
actors are at the core of a network (Figure 1) that can be 
analysed at the level of the organization as well as at the 
level of key individuals within these organisations and 
among other stakeholders.  
 Figure 1 shows that the donor may be connected to 
other stakeholders such as NGOs, consultants or commer-
cial firms in their home arena. On the beneficiary side, 
other fisheries stakeholders include individual members of 
the beneficiary organization who do not stand to benefit 
from the initiative (for example they do not do the type of 
fishing or other activities being financed). Less directly 
connected stakeholders can be non-members and other 
groups within the industry such as another primary 
cooperative within a two-tiered national cooperative 
structure, or the fisheries authority or interested parties in 
another sector such as tourism. The premise is that these 
stakeholders are not party to the initiative, although their 
support may have been used to secure funding. These 
stakeholders often are pawns in the game and, like most 
pawns, may get sacrificed as collateral damage. However, 
such stakeholders may have either already played, or could 
potentially play, a role in working with the beneficiary 
organization to achieve shared objectives were it not for 
the intervention of the funding initiative as a perturbation 
of the existing institutions and relationships. 
The playing surface is typically a small-scale fishery in 
need of management (conservation and/or development), 
and populated by fisheries organisations and institutions 
(governmental and non-governmental) that are singly each 
too weak to significantly assist advancement of the 
industry. Inability to advance through collective action may 
stem from lack of a shared vision and goals for the 
industry. This directional vacuum is available to be filled, 
therefore, by the agendas of other actors such as external 
funding agencies that may or may not be genuinely well-
intentioned. Fishing industry groups are seldom financially 
well-endowed. Those without strategic plans and strong 
leadership are more prone to ‘follow the money’, taking 
opportunistic advantage of funding in order to garner any 
resources that they can. Such resources are most often for 
their members at large or for a select powerful few. Less 
often they may be for wider distribution to non-members or 
the industry in general. The flow of resources elevates the 
status of the organisation and may offer leverage for 
liberating additional resources from elsewhere. If the 
fishing industry is not in dire straits, then modest resource 
flows tend to be appreciated but not necessarily critically 
scrutinized. This playing surface allows both the donor and 
the recipient to play a well-modulated game of supply and 
demand over an extended period with few interventions 
from others with interest in the transactions. 
The rules of the game encourage both principal players 
to seek an outcome of iterative, cyclical demand (needs) 
and supply (funds) that comes from repeated failure. Such 
failure is constrained by the need to show encouraging 
signs of success (fine-tuned) within every round played 
(herein lies the true art of the game). Strategies are 
elaborated upon below.  
 
FINE-TUNING ‘FAILURE’  
(BENEFICIARY STRATEGY) 
 
The beneficiary’s strategy is primarily to fine-tune 
failure to the point at which it can calculate precisely how 
and when to reduce its performance and hence its efforts to 
meet agreed objectives without risk to the future funding 
stream. This is not a matter of merely guessing. It is a 
carefully cultivated skill designed to manipulate the donor 
into rewarding the beneficiary with additional funding 
based upon near-success. Its features include the ability to: 
i) Demonstrate a fisheries management need that is 
not too daunting, 
ii) Court a fisheries financier to offer assistance, 
preferably long term, 
iii) Set expectations below that of the donor, focusing 
on goods supply, 
iv) Show diligence in attempting to achieve stated 
objectives but fail, 
v) Ensure failure is attributable to external environ-
ment or assumptions, 
vi) Engage donor in repeated rounds of financing, 
flows of fresh resources, 
vii) Fine-tune failure to provide greater evidence of 
progress in each round, 
viii) Build cumulative capacity to ensure there are real 
gains for survival, and 
ix) Sacrifice stakeholder adaptive capacity, self-




Figure 1. The game reveals a network of ties between the 
principal actors and among other stakeholders. 
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FAILING TO ‘SUCCEED’ (DONOR STRATEGY) 
The donor, in turn, must be a willing accomplice in 
accepting this habit of failing to succeed. The game cannot 
proceed into repeated rounds without continued coopera-
tion, and indeed collaboration, from the second principal 
player. The donor’s payoff is to look good in rendering 
assistance and to be able to reliably forecast both the future 
demand for funds as well as the likelihood of performance 
that will not be detrimental to its reputation. Trust is an 
essential ingredient, and features of this strategy include 
the following: 
i) Select a problem and set of interventions within 
the agency comfort zone, 
ii) Find a fisheries organization willing to pursue 
funds, but fairly competent, 
iii) Set expectations that may unrealistic, but not 
ridiculously unattainable, 
iv) Demonstrate diligence in assistance, but also a 
face forgiving of failure, 
v) Ensure failure is attributable to external environ-
ment or assumptions, 
vi) Encourage the beneficiary to maintain the pursuit 
of donor expectations , 
vii) Provide additional financing and accept failure to 
succeed as inevitable, 
viii) Use minor cumulative capacity building as 
evidence of longer term success, and 
ix) Sacrifice stakeholder adaptive capacity, self-
organization etc. for demand. 
 
RELISHING THE RHYTHM 
The relationship established between donor and 
beneficiary due to their strategies of collusion set up a 
rhythm which is sustained through a few to several funding 
cycles or rounds (Figure 2), but seldom indefinitely as 
eventually things fall apart. 
The graph is a conceptual illustration of several 
features and sequences starting from the provision of 
funding. This is not to discount the importance of the 
preceding period of networking, image building, infor-
mation exchange, negotiation and development of trust that 
would have occurred, but to accept it as given. Once 
funding is received, the beneficiary begins to mobilize and 
implement. This is slower in the first round than in 
subsequent rounds since later the beneficiary is primed to 
mobilize more quickly, in part to demonstrate responsive-
ness and increased capacity. The incrementally improving 
performance of the beneficiary declines in rate, but 
typically does not reach an asymptote, before dropping 
precipitously to some level that is higher than when the 
funding round began, but not by much. The dramatic drop 
in performance comes shortly after the funding has reached 
its peak and is coming to an end.  
From the start the stated donor expectations are high. 
They may well be matched in word by the beneficiary and 
reflected in suitably lofty goals and objectives. However, 
the real expectations of the beneficiary are typically much 
lower in terms of realistic sustained capacity. It slowly 
inches towards its own expectations with each new round 
of funding but does not reach that of the donor. Yet as it 
builds capacity with each round, and maintains a trajectory 
of slowed progress prior to the precipice, it signals that 
additional funding is justifiable. The reasons for the 
precipice can be numerous and are usually partially beyond 
the control of the beneficiary. For example, a critical skill 
that was not included in the capacity building or an event 
that takes priority at a critical time. Few donors can resist 
evidence of built capacity, even if below expectations, as a 
tangible reward for their effort and a lure to encourage 
additional funding rather than to abandon the noble cause. 
When the rhythm breaks down it is more likely to be due to 
changes in the priorities (issue, geographic, political, etc.) 
of the funding agency (the meta-game) than to any flaw in 
playing the game itself. Thus the collapse may also 
originate with an externally generated perturbation. 
Alternatively the levels of trust may deteriorate to the point 
of being insufficient to sustain a further round, an internal 
perturbation. 
Here is a practical example based upon a real situation 
with the identities of the actors withheld. The situation is a 
nearshore small-scale fishery for a demersal resource. The 
fisher association and fisheries authority are beginning to 
contemplate co-management. A donor agency is supportive 
and expects that its first step of funding joint resource 
surveys will develop into more concrete and meaningful 
governance arrangements following the typical three 
Figure 2. Patterns of interaction over three rounds of performance and funding. 
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phases of co-management (McConney et al. 2003). Round 
1 concludes with the joint surveys done and management 
advice offered, but there are issues with empowering the 
fishers to play a more meaningful role in management. 
The second round of funding focuses on strengthening 
collective action and capacity within the fishers’ group. 
The intent is to get them further into data analysis, 
interpretation and decision-making rather than data 
collection alone. In the first round the members received 
valuable training and personal income from the surveys. 
However, efforts to strengthen the group from the bottom 
up are unsuccessful despite some evidence of them 
becoming more aware of the co-management process and 
their potential to influence policy. Leadership is lacking 
and interest is short-term. 
The third round focuses on the fisheries authority, the 
other co-management partner, making greater effort to put 
in place the arrangements for co-management, thereby 
creating an enabling environment. Funds are provided for 
more attention to the institutional arrangements with the 
fisher group, there are funds for a public awareness 
campaign to promote conservation and of course the usual 
funding for surveys. In this round it becomes obvious that 
the latter will remain the limit of the engagement. Funds 
for this are readily absorbed and promising starts are made 
on other fronts. However, it is now clear that neither the 
fisher group nor the fisheries authority is seriously 
interested in co-management beyond this limited engage-
ment. The expectations of the funding agency are dashed 
and the funding cycle collapses. Despite this overall 
failure, all parties can claim to have made progress during 
their brief collusion.   
 
CALCULATING COLLATERAL DAMAGE  
The above strategies are not without external costs. 
That is, those who are not directly involved in the enter-
prise bear some of the costs but few, if any, of the benefits. 
Observation suggests that these losers are often the other 
fisheries stakeholders (see Figure 1) and their institutions. 
However, a few may also be silent partners to the enter-
prise, not benefitting greatly but not objecting either as 
perhaps they see their turn in the future. I argue that 
stakeholders: 
i) Become encouraged by prospect of assistance to 
improve and/or sustain livelihoods, 
ii) Become discouraged by repeated failures which 
‘prove’ inability to effectively organize, 
iii) Share in the goods and services provided by the 
project to the extent of not objecting, 
iv) Develop a dependency syndrome that stifles 
adaptive capacity and self-organization, 
v) Remain resilient in the dependency domain once 
the meta-game also remains stable , 
vi) Cannot transform the system since cumulative 
capacity does not reach the threshold , and 
vii) Do not develop institutions of good governance 
that facilitate achieving transformation. 
In the previous practical example of the nearshore 
fishery heading towards co-management there were other 
actors with an interest in the fishery such as an environ-
mental NGO, fish traders, other fisher groups and unorgan-
ised fishers (Figure 1). It is possible that by pooling 
resources and collaborating that the surveys could have 
been done while at the same time building stronger 
collaborative institutions among diverse fishery stakehold-
ers. This is not to suggest that such a scenario would be 
inevitable or without its own challenges and constraints. 
Yet it would have provided an alternative opportunity for 
self-organization that may have thrived in a genuinely 
enabling policy environment that favoured co-management 
as a governance arrangement.  
 
GROWING GOVERNANCE 
Using the concept of an adaptive cycle (Gunderson 
and Holling 2002) we can envisage that building the donor
-beneficiary relationship is a networking phase, followed 
by the relative stability of the repeated rounds of successful 
funding, and then collapse after which there is a period of 
rethinking the funding and governance arrangements 
(Figure 3).  
The funding cycles are not sustainable because there 
will either be a change in the game that originates external-
ly, or the disenchanted stakeholders will find a window of 
opportunity internally that lowers the funding system 
threshold sufficient for transformation and rethinking. I 
argue that the latter offers an opportunity for growing 
governance. It is an opportunity for promoting self-
organising institutions and changing the game from what 
stakeholders remember it to be into a regime with less 
dependence and more adaptive capacity. The institutional 
memory of the funding game is important for measuring 
progress towards improved governance arrangements. 
Marine resource governance in the Caribbean appears to be 
at a crossroad where stakeholders are seeking new 
directions. Caribbean fisheries are not as attractive to 
Figure 3. Cycle of funding, collapse and rebuilding provides 
opportunity for transformation. 
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donors as they used to be. The notions of social-ecological 
systems and resilience thinking may be useful in re-
shaping images to guide governance arrangements towards 
new definitions of success that contribute more tangibly 
and sustainably to social and economic development. 
Donors are still required to be partners in this new game, 
but playing by different rules. The first steps, however, 
need to be taken by the beneficiaries to break the funding 
cycles, forego fine-tuning failure, and engage fully in 
strategies that favour success.  
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